Introduction
There has been a resurgence of interest in the role of social interactions in determining the rate at which technologies are adopted (Bandiera and Rasul (2006) , Burke, Fournier, and Prasad (2007) , Conley and Udry (2007) , Goolsbee and Klenow (2002) , Manski (2004 Manski ( ,2006 , Munshi (2004) , Skinner and Staiger (2005) , Young (2007) ). Some of these recent efforts represent an attempt at resolution of early debates that emerged when Griliches produced his seminal work on the adoption of hybrid corn varieties in agriculture (1957, 1958) . Griliches was criticized by rural sociologists Havens and Rogers (1961) among others for ignoring the social determinants of adoption decisions
1 . An important methodological implication of the new social interactions and adoption literature is that it
shows that economic incentives and social influences may be synthesized so that any antithesis assumed between economic and social explanations is a false one; private incentives and social incentives are both compatible with the choice-based logic that Griliches developed.
This paper focuses on the properties of a particular rational expectations model of heterogeneous atomistic potential adopters. "Social interactions" in the context of this model constitute positive feedback external spillover effects from the fraction having already adopted to the payoff received by each agent who has adopted; this type of social interaction has been dubbed "endogenous" by Manski (1993) as it involves feedback from the behaviors (as opposed to characteristics) of others onto each individual. Our objective is to identify properties of adoption curves that imply the presence of social interactions under relatively weak assumptions. Of course, any judgment on whether these assumptions are weak enough to be plausible will depend on context. In motivating our analysis in various places, we will return to the hybrid corn example, which continues to be of interest; Skinner and Staiger (2005) and Sutch (2008) are recent studies that revisit Griliches' analysis. The general literature on adoption of new technologies, network effects, learning effects, and the relationship of adoption to general social interactions is very large and had moved far beyond Griliches's early studies; see the survey by Hoppe (2002) , but the hybrid corn example remains an exemplar.
We characterize equilibria for rational adopters who maximize intertemporal profits. This characterization is oriented towards uncovering observational implications of social interactions on adoption curves that are robust to various types of observed and unobserved heterogeneity. In doing this, we are particularly concerned to identify observable implications that are robust to the presence of heterogeneity. To our knowledge the integration of social interactions into a rational expectations model of atomistic heterogeneous potential adopters and the study of the observational implications for the adoption curve is new. 2 We recognize that for many questions the adoption curve may be of less interest than other features of patterns of adoption (e.g. delays in adopting superior technologies, patterns of strategic interaction between a small number of major players, etc.), especially for policy making. Independent of any intrinsic interest in adoption curves, our analysis argues these curves may be used to uncover social interaction effects of the type that have been a primary focus of the recent literature, and can do so in a way that requires relatively weak assumptions by a researcher 3 Our analysis reveals two properties that may assist empirical researchers in interpreting some interesting patterns in the data. First, we demonstrate that social interactions can produce jumps in the fraction of a population who have adopted by a particular date 4 . Second, we demonstrate that social interactions can produce pattern reversals in which agents whose private characteristics suggest they would adopt earlier than others but in fact adopt later. The potential for pattern reversals follows from the requirement that agents with greater ability to profit from a new technology adopt before those with relatively lesser ability. The reason that this requirement empirically 2 See Aradillas-Lopez (2007), Durlauf (2001a,b,2007) , Graham (2008) , Ioannides and Zabel (2008) , Lee (2007) and Manski (1993) for examples of the relevant econometric literature on social interactions. 3 Geroski (2000 p. 1) argues that the "dominant stylized fact" concerning new technology diffusion is that "the usage of new technologies over time typically follows an S-curve." He goes on to organize the diffusion literature according to whether this shape is due to social factors (what he calls an epidemic model) or individual factors (what he calls a probit model). Our analysis combines both explanations into a single model and considers what robust implications follow from the presence of social factors. We discuss the question of S-shaped adoption curves in Section 6. 4 The capacity of rational expectations to produce interesting jumps in equilibrium variables has long been recognized; see Sargent and Wallace (1973) for a classic example.
distinguishes cases with and without social interactions is that under monotonic (in ability) adoption curves, lower ability agents face an environment in which a larger percentage of the population will have adopted than higher ability ones and hence may experience stronger social interaction effects because they adopt at a later date. In order to reconcile the difference in the strength of social interactions with the monotonicity requirement in adoption times and individual ability, discontinuities can occur. As for pattern reversals, the presence of discontinuities within adoption curves with respect to unobservables can break the monotonicity of adoption with respect to observables.
To be clear, neither of these properties is necessary for the presence of social interactions, and each is sufficient only in conjunction with additional assumptions on the adoption process. That said, the relatively weak nature of these assumptions (compared to others that appear in the literature) combined with the fact that these patterns only occur when social interactions are large (in a sense made precise below), provide strategies for empiricists to uncover social influences in adoption.
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While we certainly do not claim to have established that either discontinuities or pattern reversals constitute a sine qua non of observable implications of social interactions in adoption contexts, we do believe they represent useful directions for uncovering social influences on individual behavior. As such, we follow a research strategy in the social interactions literature developed in Brock and Durlauf (2007) , Graham (2008) of trying to identify implications of social interactions that hold for an array of assumptions on unobserved heterogeneity and so may be regarded as robust implications 6 . Concerns that unobserved heterogeneity can mask social 5 We thank an anonymous referee for this formulation. 6 The ability of discontinuities and pattern reversals to reveal social interaction effects in adoption curves does not rely on the existence of multiple equilibria, which is the source of the pattern reversal findings in Brock and Durlauf (2007) . Rather, it follows from the requirement that agents with greater ability to profit from a new technology adopt before those with relatively lesser ability. The reason this requirement empirically distinguishes cases with and without social interactions is that lower ability agents face an environment in which a larger percentage of the population will have adopted than higher ability ones and hence may experience stronger social interaction effects. In order to reconcile the difference in the strength of social interactions with the monotonicity requirement in adoption times and individual ability, discontinuities and pattern reversals can occur. The uncovering of evidence of social interactions via multiple equilibria would require repeated influences were formalized at least as far back as Granovetter (1978) ; our findings suggest one way to constructively proceed.
This approach to uncovering social interactions complements the set of strategies that have been previously proposed to uncover social influences in adoption. For example, Strang and Tuma (1993) propose estimation methods for spatial and temporal heterogeneity in adoption; this is done by making parametric assumptions on the adoption times process and treating unobserved heterogeneity as independent and identically distributed across agents. Similarly, Goolsbee and Klenow (2002) use individual level data to estimate social influences by regressing individual adoption decisions on past aggregate adoption decisions in cities. This type of strategy presupposes a richer microeconomic data set than we do in order to construct individual-specific control variables as well functional form assumptions on the payoff function to adoption. It further relies on instrumental variables strategies for controlling for self-selection and unobserved group effects, the validity of which requires strong assumptions on the nature of the unobserved heterogeneity. Regression approaches have recently been augmented by analyses that use information social networks to help facilitate identification of social effects, e.g. Burke, Fournier, and Prasad (2007) and Conley and Udry (2007) ; these approaches also rely on functional form assumptions in developing inferences. Another approach to uncovering social interactions in adoption is due to Skinner and Staiger (2005) who employ cross state differences in adoption rates and their correlations with social capital measures to argue that social interactions are present. Analyses of that type require strong exchangeability assumptions about state-level behavior which may be problematic. 7 Our approach of course relies on a range of assumptions as well, hence our emphasis that we provide a complement to other strategies.
In terms of economic structure, two papers are closest to ours. Cabral (1990) , in what appears to be a relatively neglected contribution, studies adoption curves when social interactions (in his language, network externalities) are present and shows how observations of the same environment, so that differences in the equilibrium outcomes can be used to infer the presence of the multiplicity. No such mechanism is available here. 7 Brock and Durlauf (2001c) discuss the analogous difficulty in the context of cross-country growth regressions; see Durlauf (2002) for a discussion of the difficulties of using regressions to infer social capital effects. discontinuities in adoption curves may result. 8 We differ from Cabral first in terms of our analysis of forward looking agents who face dynamic profit flows and second in our analysis of observable implications in the presence of various types of heterogeneity. 9 Our analysis also shares much in common with Young (2007) 8 We became aware of Cabral's paper after writing the first draft of this one. We wish to emphasize Cabral's priority in uncovering the discontinuity property for adoption, despite differences in our microeconomic specifications. 9 Other papers share important similarities with our analysis and Cabral's. de Paula (2007) studies a model of synchronization in the presence of social interactions. This analysis produces interdependences in hazard functions for individuals and in turn is related to Brock and Durlauf (2001b) and especially Sirakaya (2006) each of which directly embeds social interactions in a duration framework. Adsera and Ray (1998) consider a dynamic migration model with spillovers and show that lags in the effects of social interactions can eliminate multiple equilibria. 10 Reinganum's pioneering work (1981a Reinganum's pioneering work ( ,1981b is an especially important predecessor in as it provides adoption settings in which decisions are interdependent because of the , where x may be infinite.
Individual actors choose adoption times t in order to maximize the objective function ( ) 
In this expression ρ is the discount rate, C is the cost of adoption, a is the rate of technical progress, Relative to standard adoption models, the only innovation is the presence of ( ) e q s in the profit function. Our objective is to understand whether observed adoption behavior can reveal the role of social interactions in individual decisions.
We make the following assumptions on various elements of this decision problem.
competitive structure. Reinganum shows that this force alone (with no heterogeneity across individual actors) is enough to produce many Nash equilibria with heterogeneous adoption times. In her analysis, early adoption by one firm hurts the profitability of adoption by others, which is the opposite of social interaction effects we study. Assumption A.1 is necessary to make sure that each individual's maximization problem is well defined; it simply ensures that the present discounted value of profits is bounded. Assumption A.2 restricts the set of admissible beliefs by imposing a monotonicity requirement. This is substantively restrictive. We make the assumption in order to render the problem of characterization of the set of rational expectations equilibria tractable.
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We conjecture that monotone beliefs may be plausible in microfounded models where adopters are learning about their new technology by newsletters, user groups, and other mechanisms of information transfer where the usefulness of the information transferred is increasing in the fraction that have already adopted the particular technology under scrutiny. The assumption is also plausible in contexts where the new technology is generally understood to be one that will eventually become widespread; in the case of hybrid corn the US Department of Agriculture systematically proselytized on its 11 The assumption is especially useful in finding rational expectations equilibria in that we follow the standard strategy in macroeconomics models of in essence conjecturing that agents form beliefs that have certain properties and then showing that these beliefs are justified in the equilibrium law of motion for the system. behalf (Sutch (2008) ), so it seems reasonable to assume that farmers expected the use of hybrid corn to monotonically rise. Similarly, one could imagine such beliefs for advances such as the Pentium chip that are recognized as state-of-the-art and certain to eventually supplant previous technologies. Assumption A.3 restricts the payoff function and is therefore substantive in its impositions of monotonicity, but is of course far weaker than assuming a particular functional form. The requirement that the heterogeneity scalar x has a monotonic effect on profits limits what sorts of interpretation may be placed on it.
The assumption that the profit function is increasing in q means that we are focusing on strictly positive interactions. As such, the assumption is consistent with claims about network goods; Gandal (2008) surveys evidence of these effects for a very wide of contexts.
Our analysis does not distinguish between mechanisms for network effects, i.e. a direct benefit from the adoption of a technology by others as occurs with a word processing program or information externalities by which the usage of a technology by others communicates relative payoffs to an individual or even factors such as increasing support structure for a technology based on market size 12 . Assumption A.4 allows us to ignore strategic interactions, i.e. we treat each agent as atomistic. The assumption is sensible when an individual adopter is small relative to the overall group.
All propositions stated in the paper assume at least some of A.1-A.4; for ease of exposition we assume all of them for each of our lemmas and theorems. Further, we always assume that there is a finite date in the past when the new technology first appears and the first adoption occurs after that date; without loss of generality we designate the date at which the innovation first appears as 0.
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Finally, we conceptualize each agent as 12 Our blackbox approach to social interactions is common in the social interactions literature and indeed a limitation of the literature.
13 Sutch (2008) choosing an adoption time from ( )
, this avoids problems of corner solutions in the optimization problem.
The first order necessary condition (FONC) and secondary order necessary condition (SONC) for the optimal adoption time * t by type x are given by ( )
and ( ) < where " − " denotes the operation of taking the left limit and "+" denotes the operation of taking the right limit. A local maximum is characterized (in our case) by the left limit being greater than the right derivative with a zero between these two values. From (1), the first and second order necessary conditions for a local maximum at t may be expressed as ( ) 
since this inequality can be decomposed in terms of the usual FONC and SONC,
In the case where ( ) e q t is differentiable at date t , the FONC is quite intuitive as it amounts to equating the marginal benefit to adoption at a given time with the associated marginal cost. To understand the SONC, rewrite (2) as
Substituting into (3), the second order condition holds if and only if ( )
,
x q t dq t a x q t q t dt
Equation (6) is satisfied provided that 
The first inequality is immediate from the FONC, since the cost of adoption is positive.
The second inequality holds by Assumption A.3 above. The third inequality cannot be assessed without specification of the expectations formation process. 
, this is a signal that optimal t is some negative number for type
The following lemma provides a sufficient condition for uniqueness of an individual adoption time.
14 Throughout, we write t t t − + = = for the parts of functions that are continuous in t .
Lemma 1. Uniqueness of optimal adoption time
Given, A.1-A.5, the optimal time to adopt for each agent type exists and is unique.
For comparative purposes, we note the case where there are no social interactions,
In this case the optimal adoption times follow
where x is defined by ( )
x by Assumption A.3; this simply means that higher productivity types adopt earlier as the profit incentives are higher.
Adoption curves and rational expectations equilibria
We now consider equilibria under social interactions by imposing a rationality requirement on beliefs about adoption levels. This assumption may naturally be criticized, especially in the context of a technological innovation. On the other hand, to the extent that our analysis is designed to compare environments with and without social interactions, expectations only matter when social effects are absent, hence deviations from rationality are not relevant under the "null hypothesis" that social effects are absent. An interesting exercise, beyond the scope of this paper, is to understand whether plausible alternative expectations formation mechanisms can restrict adoption patterns in robust ways analogous to those we find.
To develop a rational expectations equilibrium, observe first that, for any expectations process, one can construct the actual adoption curve ( ) q t that describes the percentage of the population which has adopted by date t . We first note a lemma. Monotonicity means that the adoption rate may be calculated using the formula ( )
where the lower integral limit ( ) Since the profit functions are assumed to depend on the expected adoption curves of each agent, rational expectations equilibria thus are straightforward to define as they require that the beliefs about adoption rate coincide with the actual adoption rates along an equilibrium path.
Definition: rational expectations equilibrium (REE).
A rational expectations equilibrium is a pair of functions ( ) * t x and ( ) * q t such that i. individual adoption times are optimal, and ii. the aggregate adoption curve is consistent with these individually optimal choices.
The requirements of a rational expectations equilibrium, implicitly characterizes the optimal adoption times. At points of differentiability, the optimal times must fulfill
and the equilibrium fraction who have adopted by date t , ( )
Substituting (11) into (10) ( )
In contrast to this function, one can consider a best response function for each type in which the population fraction adopting corresponds to the distribution of types: 
to occur at time
Hence an observable implication of social interactions, when the interactions are strong enough to induce a nonmonotonicity in the function ( )
that there may exist at least one jump in ( )
As our objective is to explicitly link discontinuities in the REE function ( ) * q t to the identification of social interactions, we formulate a theorem for the particular case of ( )
S x
in which the function has a single local minimum min x and a single finite local maximum max x ; Figure 1 illustrates the qualitative shape of ( ) S x that is assumed in the theorem The structure of the theorem makes it evident that other formulations are possible. While we conjecture that a more general theorem may be produced which directly maps the nonmonotonicity of ( )
we have yet to show this; the difficulty is that in dynamic models, one needs to evaluate the best reply function against the full dynamic path of the associated adoption curve. A parametric example of the theorem is provided in the Appendix. 
A. There exists an REE, ( ) B. There exists one jump point of positive size in the equilibrium adoption curve ( )
which occurs at ( )
C. There is a mass point,
This discontinuity property represents a variant of a partial identification argument in econometrics, cf. Manski (2003) . By this, we mean that the presence of social interactions can, for certain magnitudes of the interactions, place restrictions on observable data, but that these restrictions neither identify the exact magnitude of the interactions (in this case the effects of q on ( ) x so that ( )
An example in the hybrid corn context is the date 1936 when the news that hybrid corn produced much more then open pollinated varieties in that drought year spread like wildfire through the farming community and caused the demand for hybrid seed to explode (Sutch (2008, page 18) ). This would look like a jump in the data but would not be 15 Our form of partial identification differs from that typically found in Manski's work as his approach produces bounds on unknown objects of interest whereas ours uncovers the sign of an object of interest (the partial derivative of the profit function with respect to adoption) and information about the magnitude as it affects the equilibrium behavior of the adoption curve. The application of this Theorem would require that a researcher is able to identify distinct cases of adoption under different ( ) 16 One might argue that in the hybrid corn historical record our model is most relevant to the period after the 1936 jump. Following Sutch (2008) , this is so because of the combination of the key initial role of Henry Agard Wallace in promoting the use of hybrid corn and the fact that it did not dramatically expand until prompted by the news of the very high relative yields in the drought year, 1936. Sutch discusses the continued improvement of varieties of hybrid corn, the role of demonstration plots, the sharing of information about tailoring varieties to specific land types and the role of agricultural extension offices in the diffusion process of hybrid corn.
Unobservable heterogeneity
In this section we introduce unobservable heterogeneity and consider how empirical implications are affected. Interestingly, unobservable heterogeneity can produce a different route to uncovering social interactions that is not present when the heterogeneity is absent. We focus on the case of one observable and one unobservable. Before doing so, we first illustrate how this case can capture key features of the general case of multiple observables and multiple unobservables, so long as π is monotonically increasing in all
variables. An elementary result in functional separability theory as applied to general utility theory (Varian (1992, p. 150) ) is that for a vector x and scalar q , if 1) ( ) for all x , x′ , q and q′ , then there exists a "subprofit" function ( ) u x (mapping x to a scalar) and an aggregator function ( )
If ( ) , V u q is strictly increasing in ( ) , u q one may simply repeat our earlier analysis by replacing x in the above analysis with u . Hence in an REE, it must be the case that ( )
. In an REE, when ( ) , V u q is independent of q , individuals with higher levels of u adopt first. When ( ) , V u q varies in q , the best response adoption times for individuals with level u is given by
In parallel to our earlier discussion, the unconditional equilibrium adoption curve is given by ( ) ( ) 
(Note that since we are focusing only on positive adoption times, we use the convention that we just state ( ) * t u for negative adoption times even though the equality still holds for negative adoption times.)
Functional separability provides a general strategy for introducing unobservables.
Suppose that productivity is a vector rather than a scalar attribute. Partition the vector as
where 1 x is observable and 1 x − is not. We may now repeat our earlier analysis to conditional adoption curves ( )
q t x . These curves must obey ( )
This indicates how the scalar observable/ scalar unobservable case we consider is in fact quite general.
We now focus on ( ) Without any restrictions on the unobservables, one cannot identify any observable implications for social interaction effects on adoption curves. Any adoption pattern that is generated with social interactions can be replicated with them by suitable choice of the process describing the unobservable variable. We proceed by using a "weak" assumption on the unobservable:
A.5.
Stochastic dominance is an example of a shape restriction. Shape restrictions are not only weaker than functional form restrictions, they are often interpretable in economic terms in ways that functional forms are not. For example, if one thinks of individual farmers as characterized by an unobservable ability level and an observable education level, then stochastic dominance says nothing more than higher education levels imply that the density of abilities is shifted to the right. Brock and Durlauf (2007) show how stochastic dominance can facilitate identification of social interactions, using partial identification arguments.
This work, in turn, draws from Manski (1997) and Manski and Pepper (2000) who emphasize the constructive role of assumptions such as shape restrictions.
Theorem 3. Monotonicity of adoption curves with respect to observables. 
As a special case of the Theorem and Corollary, if 1 x and 2 x are independent, then a pattern reversal is interpretable as evidence of social interactions.
Our earlier remarks on functional separability indicate that Theorem 3 and 
Comparisons to other approaches to uncovering social interactions in adoption
In this section, we consider some previous approaches which have been proposed for uncovering social interactions via adoption curves.
A. logistic functions and adoption curves
It is often claimed that logistic adoption curves are evidence of social interactions; Schelling (1997) provides an overview of interpretations of logistic curves as evidence of social effects; see also Geroski (2000) . For our model, a logistic curve does not represent evidence of social effects. In our model, the derivative of the adoption curve is
and can be constructed by solving the ordinary differential equation,
But it follows from the definition of ( )
Hence, given (30) shows that the mapping of a logistic curve to social interactions is not robust when this type of heterogeneity is present.
One can develop a parallel analysis to demonstrate that, in the context of our model, logistic adoption curves may be generated in absence of social interactions.
Suppose that the profit function does not embody social interactions and has the form ( )
Mimicking our earlier arguments, profit maximization implies that equilibrium adoption times are implicitly defined by
Previous arguments establish that
Further, (26) indicates the necessary condition for a logistic adoption curve. Combining these yields the following differential equation for
Integrating both sides of (33) (using partial fractions for the LHS) one obtains the solution
and
where the constant
. This is a logistic function.
Our demonstration that a logistic shape may arise from a variant of our model without interactions derives from a particular distribution function ( ) X F x . One can therefore object that this is a knife edge case. However, the derivation of a logistic curve itself depends on special functional form assumptions. Further, as originally noted by Feller (1940) and further argued in Brock (1999) and Dinardo and Winfree (2007) , it is very difficult to distinguish logistic functions from other S-shaped functions. This has led to some authors arguing that social versus individual explanations of adoptions are distinguished by accelerating versus nonaccelerating adoption curve shapes 18 . We note 18 Reader (2004, p. 90) argues that this view is especially true in social learning models: "In general, social learning processes are argued to result in accelerating diffusion curves, such here that our argument on the inability of the logistic to differentiate presence or absence of social interactions immediately adapts to this case 19 .
B. relative acceleration rates
Young (2007) is a recent effort that employs adoption curve shapes to uncover social interactions. His analysis is based on a function he calls the relative acceleration rate, which measures the rate of change of the adoption curve when different fractions of adoptions have occurred. Formally, letting r denote the fraction of the population that as adopted, the relative acceleration rate equals
evaluated at where .
Young argues that for one type of social interactions model, a social learning process (in which each agent updates beliefs about the relative payoffs between adoption and nonadoption based on observed choices of others), the relative acceleration rate may be increasing whereas in another type of social interactions model, a contagion process (in which each agent adopts when he comes into contact with someone else who has adopted), the relative acceleration rate can never increase.
To understand the behavior of the relative acceleration rate in our model, algebraic manipulation reveals that, even when social interactions are absent, the relative acceleration rate for our model is as the logistic, exponential or the hyperbolic sine...Cumulative distributions characterized by nonaccelerating functions (e.g. linear or logarithmic) are thought to be compatible with asocial (individual) learning models." Reader notes that this holds for prominent studies such as Boyd and Richerson (1985) . 
where the quantities are evaluated at ( ) * r x t . Additional algebraic manipulation produces ( 
For our purposes, what is important about this expression is that one can manufacture a wide variety of shapes of ( ) 
Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed a model of adoption decisions in which social interactions are present. Our analysis indicates that even in the presence of observable and unobservable heterogeneity, it is possible to uncover properties of adoption curves that observationally differentiate environments in which social interactions matter from those that do not. Nevertheless, the jumps we find in discrete time translate into large changes in a discretely sampled adoption curve. If one finds that adoption increases slowly, suddenly increases rapidly at one time increment, and then increases slowly again, this is suggestive of a jump in the underlying continuous adoption process. Notice that this type of finding is much sharper than the finding of an S-shaped adoption curve, which we in fact have argued is not a robust implication of social interactions models. While assessing whether a particular change in an adoption curve is too large to be plausibly associated with fundamentals requires judgment, this does not invalidate its utility.
Pattern reversals are also in principle estimable. For this case, the empirical objects of interest are pairs of conditional adoption curves ( ) q t x′ and ( ) q t x′′ , where x x ′ ′′ > and one can assume that private incentives to adopt are increasing in x . Recalling Theorem 3, the absence of a pattern reversal requires that ( ) ( ) q t x q t x t ′ ≥ ∀ . This requirement in turn is a form of stochastic dominance requirement (on adoption curves) and may be assessed using methods developed in Barrett and Donald (2003) and Linton, Maasoumi, and Whang (2005) . Unlike the jump case, pattern reversal claims are not sensitive to whether continuous time or discrete time data are available. 
The second inequality between the 0's follows because 1 2 t t < and the third inequality follows from monotonicity of ( ) , π ⋅ ⋅ and ( ) ( ) Suppose by way of contradiction that The same argument as above shows that the best reply property is satisfied for
We next verify that the optimal t for 
This same inequality holds for all 
We next show that ( )
which is negative because ( ) * 0 S x ′ < . This completes the proof for
The proof for each ( ) 
. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2.
If there are no social interactions,
Hence the equation
by stochastic dominance.
Proof of Theorem 3.
The proof of the first part is obtained from a straightforward chain of inequalities that exploits the assumption that
is independent of q and is strictly increasing in both x 's as well as Assumption A.5, Formally,
2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
The first inequality follows from eq. (22) and the second follows from ( ) ( )
, which follows from ( ) ( )
, an inequality which follows directly from the assumption that ( ) 
,
A ∞ such that they join together to form a continuous function. The parameters of these functions will be designed so they generate an example of Theorem 1. This exercise will prove that Theorem 1 applies to a nontrivial set of examples.
We define the first function by ( ) Our second function will be defined by ( We still need to choose the parameters so that the local maximum value of π is smaller than
,1 X A F A π − so that we have a positive atom for our jump. This is satisfied provided that ( ) 
